Good Corporate Governance, Corporate Social Responsibility, dan Financial Distress dimoderasi Leverage

Abstract

This research aims to examine the influence of board of director size and the proportion of independent commissioners as proxies of Good Corporate Governance, along with Corporate Social Responsibility, on the likelihood of Financial Distress among listed companies, with leverage as a moderating variable. A casual associative quantitative approach was employed, with the research subjects comprising listed companies in the tourism, recreation, restaurant, and hospitality sub-sectors on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the 2021-2024 period. The final sample consisted of 24 companies yielding a total of 96 observations. Logistic regressions analysis incorporating Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) was conducted using IBM SPSS version 31. Financial distress was assessed using Altman Z-Score model with specific adjustments for non-manufacturing firms, with 57.3% of observations classified as distressed. The findings reveal that board of director size and corporate social responsibility disclosure exert a significant negative effect on the risk of financial distress (p-value=0,015 & 0,044; B=-1,831 & -6,345). Conversely, the proportion of independent commissioners was found to have no significant effect on financial distress (p-value=0,668). Regarding moderation effects, leverage was found to significantly strengthen the protective role of independent commissioners under high-leverage conditions, while simultaneously weakening the protective effect of CSR disclosure when debt burden increases (p-value=0,043 & 0,007 ; B=-23,482 & 18,346). However, leverage did not significantly moderate the relationship between board of directors and financial distress (p-value=0,510). The implications of these findings suggest that strengthening board structure and enhancing CSR disclosure serve as primary protective mechanisms against financial distress risk, with prudent leverage management serving as a critical prerequisite for the effectiveness of CSR and independent commissioner oversight, particularly within the tourism, recreation, restaurant, and hospitality industries, which are inherently susceptible to external economic shocks. This study contributes theoretically by simultaneously testing leverage as a moderator of the GCG-CSR relationship with financial distress in the post-pandemic tourism sector, a context rarely examined in prior research. Practically, these findings serve as a reference for management and investors in designing governance policies and CSR disclosure that are adaptive to capital structure conditions, and offer input for regulators in encouraging substantive independent commissioner oversight beyond mere formal compliance with the 33.3% minimum threshold.